May 2, 2012
When Just Right is Unjust: Goldilocks Jurisprudence and the Right to Counsel in Post-Conviction Appeals
By Hugh Mundy
During its October 2011 term, the Supreme Court issued two well-publicized decisions severely curtailing the already tenuous Fourth Amendment rights of the accused and incarcerated. First, in Howes v. Fields, the Court held that prisoner interrogations held “in private” about “events occurring outside the prison” do not require Miranda warnings. In addition, in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, the Court sanctioned jailhouse strip searches of arrestees without reasonable – or any – suspicion of criminal activity. Even as the Court further eviscerated the Fourth Amendment rights of those in custody, two other rulings, Maples v. Thomas and Martinez v. Ryan, extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for incarcerated litigants. Still, unlike the obvious damage to prisoner’s rights wrought by the Fourth Amendment cases, the utility of the Maples and Martinez for inmates seems murky at best.
In Maples, the Court held that a death row inmate established good cause to excuse his failure to move for post-conviction relief after his lawyers missed a filing deadline in state court. While the case made headlines as Maples’ pro bono attorneys hailed from the prestigious New York firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, its precedential value appears limited. Indeed, in determining that Maples demonstrated good cause for his delinquency, the Court narrowly tailored its ruling to the unique case facts surrounding the botched appeal. Those “unusual and extraordinary circumstances” included a “mail room mix-up” at Sullivan & Cromwell, a failure by Maples’ local counsel to file a notice of appeal, and an admission by Maples’ trial attorneys that they “were stumbling around in the dark” during the sentencing phase of his trial. In a concurring opinion, Justice Alito noted that Maples was entitled to relief due to the “perfect storm of misfortune” that engulfed his appeal.
Martinez, by contrast, received comparably little media attention. The case may have been overlooked because it deals, in large part, with complicated state procedural rules governing access to federal habeas corpus review. As a result, the opinion is not easily reduced to sound-bites or headlines.
Read more